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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether or not the Vehicle Registration Ordinance 
of Logan City, § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan 
City under which the defendant was charged is Unconstitutional? 
2. Whether or not the defendant was placed twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense by being tried twice for the 
same offense of No Utah Registration in violation of the Utah 
and the United States Constitution? 
3. Whether or not the statutes under Utah's Motor Vehicle 
Act are unconstitutionally vague in violation of Due Process of 
Law? 
4. Whether or not the statutes under Utah's Seat Belt 
Usage Act are unconstitutional and violate the provisions of 
Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution? 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
§ 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City, 
(See addendum). 
§ 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City, 
(See Addendum). 
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Utah Code Annotated, § 4]-]-]8, (1953 as amended), 
(See Addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-1-19, (1953 as amended), 
(See addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-1-1, (1953 as amended), 
(See addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-182, (1953 as amended), 
(See addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-183, (1953 as amended), 
(See addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-184, (1953 as amended), 
(See addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-403, (1953 as amended), 
(See Addendum). 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum). 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum). 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution (See addendum). 
Fifth Amendment to the Uni ted States Constitution, 
(See addendum). 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
(See addendum) «, 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged by Information filed on the 
27th day of October, ]989 in the First Circuit Court of the 
State of Utah, County of Cache, Logan City Department for the 
three offenses of: Count I of No Utah Registration; Count II 
of Failure to Signal to Turn; and Count III of Driver not Wear-
ing a Seat Belt,. (R. 73-74 ) . 
The defendant was tried for said offenses in .a jury 
trial held before the Honorable Clint S. Judkins on the 20th 
day of December, 1989. 
Officer Greg Monroe testified on behalf of Logan City 
that he was on duty as a Logan City Police Officer on the 8th 
day of August, 3 989. He was stopped at a traffic semaphore 
facing north at the intersection of 100 West and 400 North in 
Logan, Utah. He observed the defendant in the turning lane 
facing West on 400 North and 100 West. He then observed the 
defendant make a left hand turn and proceed South on 100 West. 
Officer Monroe subsequently made a U-turn and stopped the de-
fendant who was driving West on 300 North between 200 West and 
300 West. During the stop, he issued the defendant a citation 
for No Utah Registration; Not making a Left Hand Turn Signal; 
and Driver Not Wearing a Seat Belt (R. 80). 
Officer Monroe further testifed that defendant's vehicle 
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was registered in the State of Idaho and that the registration 
did not expire until the 31st day of December, 1989. Officer 
Monroe stated that a Cache County Deputy Sheriff was follow-
ing him in a Sheriff!s vehicle on 100 West, and was involved 
in stopping the defendant. The Cache County Deputy Sheriff 
did not testify at the trial. 
The defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified 
that Officer Monroe was not stopped at the traffic semaphore 
when he made a left hand turn at the intersection of 400 North 
and 100 West in Logan, Utah. He testified that he made a 
mechanical left hand turn signal when turning left at the 
intersection. He observed Officer Monroe's police vehicle 
after he made the turn and that Officer Monroe was driving 
North between 300 North and 400 North on 100 West. 
The defendant testified that he considered himself to 
be a resident of the State of Idaho and residing in Preston, 
Idaho. He stated that he worked at Logan Manufacturing in 
Logan, Utah and that because his privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle in the State of Utah had been suspended until July 3, 
1989 he also maintained an apartment in Logan, Utah for work 
purposes for the period between May 2, 1989 and August 8, 1989. 
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He had a valid Utah Driver's License on August 8, 1989. The 
jury returned a verdict of not guilty for the offense of not 
making a left hand turn signal and guilty for the offenses of 
No Utah Registration and Driver not Wearing a Seat Belt. 
Subsequent to Officer Monroe and the defendant testifying, 
the defendant's attorney moved the Court for dismissal of the 
charge of No Utah Registration on the basis that the vehicle 
registration ordinance of Logan City was unconstitutional. The-
ir ial Court denied the motion. Logan City terminated its pro-
secution under the ordinance and filed an Amended Information 
and continued the prosecution under another ordinance incorporating 
by reference the State statute, (R. 27-33, R. 66-69). The de-
fendant's attorney then moved for dismissal of the charge of 
Driver not Wearing a Seat Belt on the basis that the Logan City 
Ordinance incorporating by reference the State statute for the 
offense was unconstitutional. The Trial Court denied the Motion 
(R. 27-33). 
The defendant subsequently filed a motion and supplemental 
motion for an arrest of judgment on the basis that the statutes 
under Utah Motor Vehicle Act and Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage 
Act are unconstitutional (R. 64-65, 19-25). Logan City filed 
written response to both motions (R. 16-18, 62-63). The Trial 
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Court by Memorandum Decision denied both motions (R. 14-15, 
26). 
The defendant was sentenced for both offenses on the 
30th day of January, 1990. He was ordered to pay a total 
fine of $ 45.00 for both offenses, $ 15.00 to be suspended 
upon proof of registration (R. 13). The defendant there-
after filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 10-11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. THE LOGAN CITY VEHICLE REGISTRATION ORDINANCE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
2. THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR 
THE SAME OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION. 
3. THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
4. THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT 
BELT USAGE ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOGAN CITY VEHICLE REGISTRATION ORDINANCE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The defendant contends that Logan City's Vehicle 
Registration ordinance is unconstitutional. § 10*56.010 
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City provides as follows: 
_7_ 
ARTICLE I. REGISTRATION 
10.56.010 Vehicles. Every vehicle, at all times while 
being driven, stopped or parked upon the streets or 
alleys of the city, shall be registered in the name of 
the owner thereof in accordance with the laws of the 
state, unless such vehicle is not required by the laws 
of the state to be registered in this state, and shall 
display in proper position valid and unexpired registration 
plates or indicia of registration meeting the requirements 
of the laws of the state, clear and distinct and free from 
defacement, mutilation, grease and other obscuring matter, 
so as to be plainly visible and legible at all times; 
provided, however, if such vehicle is not required to be 
registered in this state, territory, possession or district 
of the United States or a foreign country, substantially 
complying with the provisions of this chapter, shall be 
considered as compliance with this title. 
The defendant's attorney after all the evidence had been 
presented to the Court at trial moved the Court for dismissal 
of the charge of No Utah Registration because the above ordinance 
makes criminal, activities in which the State statute for the 
same offense does not contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (1976), (R. 31-32 
Page 5 & 6 of Clerk's Minutes). 
The State statute for the same offense provides as follows: 
U.C.A. § 41-1-18 (1953 as amended) provides: 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit 
to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle 
of a type required to be registered in this State: 
The Logan City ordinance in this case makes it criminal 
to stop or park upon any alley whether public or private a 
vehicle required to be registered in this State and the State 
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statute for this same offense does not make these activities 
criminal. 
Logan City Council exceeded its authority under 
Utah's Constitution when enacting the provisions of § 
10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinance of Logan City and the 
ordinace should be declared unconstitutional under the 
principles of Allgood v. Larson, supra. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR 
THE SAME OFFENSE OF NO UTAH REGISTRATION. 
The defendant contends that he was twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense of No Utah Registration in 
violation of Article I, § 12 and Article I, § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
The defendant was charged by Information for the offense 
of No Utah Registration in violation of § 10.56.010 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City. Subsequent to the jury 
being impanelled and sworn and Officer Monroe and the 
defendant had testified, the defendant's attorney moved the 
Court for dismissal of the No Utah Registration charge 
upon the grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional, 
(R. 31-32, Page 5 & 6 of the Clerk's Minutes). The Court 
denied the motion and Logan City terminated its prosecution 
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under § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City, 
the filed an Amended Information with the Court (R. 66-69, 
R. 30, Page 4 of the Clerk's Minutes) and proceeded with its 
prosecution under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan 
City incorporating by reference, U.C.A. § 41-1-18 (1953 as 
amended). 
§ 10.04.03 0 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City 
provides as follows: 
10.04.010 Statutes adopted. All of UCA 41-1, 41-2, 
41-6, 41-7, 41-8, 41-]2(a), 41-21 and 41-22, as amended, 
together with all amendments and additions that may 
hereafter be made, are enacted, approved and adopted as 
part of this section to form the traffic code for this 
municipality, except as hereinafter specified, and by 
this reference are made a part of this title to the same 
extent and effect as though such code were copied in 
this chapter in full. Three copies of the laws adopted 
by reference shall be filed for use and examination in the 
office of city recorder. 
U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) provides as follows: 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit 
to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle 
of a type required to be registered in this State: 
U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended) provides as follows: 
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute 
shall be prosecuted in the name of the state of Utah. 
A criminal action for violation of any county or 
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the governmental entity involved. 
It is the defendant's contention that he was tried twice 
for the same offense of No Utah Registration. First, he was 
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prosecuted under § 10.56.010 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Logan City which was improperly terminated by Logan 
City. After terminating this prosecution, Logan City Amended 
the Information and prosecuted the defendant under § 10.04.010 
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by 
reference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) in which the 
jury found the defendant guilty. 
The defendant contends that the second prosecution of 
the defendant for the offense of No Utah Registration by 
Logan City under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City was barred by U.C.A. § 76-1-403, (1953 as amended). 
The defendant further contends that the second prose-
cution of the defendant for the offense of No Utah Registra-
tion by Logan City under § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Logan City violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, Waller v. Florida, 397 
U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). 
This issue was not raised in the Trial Court. This 
Court has previously held that an issue may be raised for 
the first time on appeal if the issue affected the substantial 
rights of the defendant, State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 
(Utah App. 1987). The defendant being tried twice for the 
same offense of No Utah Registration by Logan City affected 
defendant's substantial rights to Due Process of Law. 
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The Information filed with the Court on the 27th day 
of October, 1989 did not have any reference to U.C.A. § 41-1-
18, (1953 as amended). Logan City had every opportunity to 
Amend the Information prior to the jury being impanelled and 
sworn but waited until all the evidence had been introduced 
at trial. Logan City dismissed the charge of No Utah Registra-
tion by terminating its proseuction under § 10.56.010 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City. Logan City was barred under 
the provisions of Rule 25 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in prosecuting the defendant for No Utah Registration 
in violation of § 10.04.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan 
City Incorporating by reference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended). 
The defendant was placed twice in jeopardy by being tried 
twice for the same of offense of No Utah Registration in vio-
lation of the Utah and United States Constitution. The con-
viction for No Utah Registration should therefore be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE ACT ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
The? defendant in this case was charged by Amended Infor-
mation (R.- 66-69) for violating the provisions of § 10.04.010 
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by re-
ference U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) which provides as 
follows: 
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(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person 
to drive or move or for an owner knowingly to 
permit to be driven or moved upon any highway 
any vehicle of a type required to be registered 
in this State: 
The exceptions of vehicles required to be registered 
in the State of Utah is defined under the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 41-1-19, (1953 as amended) in which the pertinent 
part states as follows: 
(1) Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, 
trailer, and simitrailer, when driven or moved upon 
a highway, is subject to the registration and 
certificate of title provisions of this chapter except: 
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used or maintained 
for the transportation of passengers for hire or for 
the transportation of property, if the vehicle is duly 
registered in another state and is owned and operated 
by a nonresident of this state; 
The term of "nonresident" for the purpose of required 
vehicle registration under the Motor Vehicle Act is defined 
under the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-1, (1953 as amended) 
of which the pertinent part states as follows: 
(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is 
not a resident of this state and who does not engage 
in intrastate business within this state and operate 
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in that business any motor vehicle, trailer, 
or simitrailer within this state. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Blowers, 
717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) held that a criminal statute must 
be sufficiently clear and definite to inform persons of or-
dinary intelligence what their conduct must be to conform 
to its requirements and to advise one accused of violating it 
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged. See 
also, State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d (Utah 1975) and State v. 
Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981). 
It is defendant's contention that Utahfs Motor Vehicle 
Act does not give a clear legal definition for the term "Non-
resident" and the standards for the residency requirements for 
the purpose of required motor vehicle registration. The Utah 
Legislature had enacted statutes which give a clear legal 
definition for the standards of the residency requirements 
for the purpose of voter registration, U.C.A. § 20-2-13, & 
U.C.A. § 20-2-14, (1953 as amended); for the purpose of student 
tuition payment fees, U.C.A. § 53B-8-102, (1953 as amended); 
for the purpose of receiving public assistance, U.C.A. 
§ 62A-9-115, (1953 as amended); and also for the purpose of 
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receiving a notarial commission, U.C.A. § 46-1-3, 
(1953 as amended). However, the Utah Legislature under 
Utah's Motor Vehicle Act which imposes criminal penalties 
has failed to enact a statute which gives a clear and 
definite definition of the term of "Nonresident" and 
the residency requirements for the purpose of required 
motor vehicle registrations. 
Furthermore, the challenged statutes are unconsti-
tutional because the statutes attempts to delegate legis-
lative power to the judiciary. In People v. Latsis,195 
Colo. 411, 414, 578 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1978) and again in 
People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1981), the Colorado 
Court stated: 
Due Process of Law requires that the legislature 
provide sufficiently precise standards to guide 
a judge and jury in deciding whether a crime has 
been committed. Failure to do so may well constitute 
an unlawful delegation of legislative power. 
The power to define crimes is legislative in 
character, it may not be delegated to the judiciary. See, 
16 CoJ.S. Constitutional Law, § 159. A statute which 
delegates legislative power to the judiciary violates • 
a constitutional mandate for separation of powers. State 
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v. Smith, 183 Conn. 17, 438 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 1981). 
The statutes challenged in the instant case delegates 
to the judiciary the power to legislate the standards for the 
residency requirements under Utah's Motor Vehicle Act in each 
individual case. 
The Court in Kelm v. Carlson, 473 F.2d 1267, 1271, (Sixth 
Cir. 1973) held that the word "resident" has many different 
meanings in law, largely determined by the statutory context 
in which it is used. 
The Court in United States v. Calhoun, 566 F.2d 969, 973 
(Fifth Cir. 1978) held that a person's legal residence is the 
permanent place of abode which person intends to be his residence 
and to which he intends to return despite temporary residence 
elsewhere or despite temporary absences. 
The defendant testified that he considered himself to be 
a resident of the State of Idaho ctespitcs his temporary absence 
and temporary residence in the State of Utah (R. 29). 
Logan City contended in the Trial Court that because the 
defendant had a Utah Driver's License on August 8, 1989 that he 
was a resident of the State of Utah. However, Utah's Operator's 
License Act, U.C.A. § 41-2-102 (16), (1953 as amended) can be 
construed to require any person who resides in Preston, Idaho 
and travels or sojourns the 25 miles to Logan, Utah for employ-
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ment purposes must have a valid Utah Driverfs License. 
There are perhaps many valid arguments as to whether 
the defendant was or was not a resident of the State of 
Utah which demonstrates the vagueness of the statutes 
challenged by defendant. The statutes ar.e vague both on 
their face and as applied to defendant and therefore violate 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The defendant's conviction for No Utah 
Registration should therefore be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTES UNDER UTAH'S MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT 
BELT USAGE ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The defendant contends that the statutes under Utah's 
Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage Act, U.C.A. § 41-6-182 et seq. 
(1953 as amended) violate the provisions of Article I, § 24 
of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The defendant was charged by Information (R. 73-74, 
66-69) for violating the provisions of § 10.04.010 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by reference 
U.C.A. § 41-6-182 (1953 as amended) which reads as follows: 
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(1) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 
for children under five years of age and except 
as provided in Subsection (2) for passengers 
who are at least five years of age but younger 
than 18 years of age, the driver and front 
seat passengers of a motor vehicle as defined 
in Subsection 41-6-148.20(1), operated on a 
street or highway in this state shall wear a 
properly adjusted and fastened safety belt 
system, which meets standards promulgated by 
the Department of Public Safety. 
(2) The driver of a motor vehicle shall secure 
or cause to be secured a properly adjusted and 
fastened safety seat belt system on any passenger 
in the front seat who is at least five years of 
age but younger than 18 years of age. 
The appellant contends that the enforcement of 
§ 41-6-182 against him subjected him to arbitrary and 
invidious discrimination because the provisions of 
§ 41-6-183 (1953 as amended) excludes the following 
class of people from its operation: 
This part [article] does not apply to a driver 
or front seat passenger of: 
(5) a motor vehicle engaged in pick up, delivery, 
or service operations involving repeated starts 
and stops and requiring the fr.ont seat occupant 
to frequently, and repeatedly enter and leave 
the vehicle. 
-18-
The appellant further contends that the enforce-
ment of § 41-6-182 against him subjected him to arbitrary 
and invidious discrimination because the provisions of U.C.A. 
§ 41-6-184 (1953 as amended) excludes the following 
class of people from its operation:. 
Enforcement of this part [article] by state or 
local law enforcement agents shall be only a 
secondary action when a driver of a motor vehicle 
has been detained for a suspected violation of 
Title 41 other than this part, or another offense. 
Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that: All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
It is clear that the above statutory provisions 
violate this constiutional mandate. The Utah Supreme 
Court under the provisions of Article I § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution held a Sunday closing ordinance to be uncon-
stitutional as being arbitrarily discriminatory, Gronlund 
v. Salt Lake City, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). The Court in 
Dodge Town, Inc., v. Romney, 25 U.2d 267, 480 P.2d 461 
(1971) held a statute prohibiting Sunday sales of new or 
used automobiles by licensed dealers to be unreasonably 
discriminatory against licensed auto dealers. The Court 
in Johnston v. Stoker, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah 1984) and 
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Ma Ian v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah 1984) held that 
Utah's guest statutes violated the equal protection 
principles of the above section of the Utah Consti-
tution. The Court in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite 
Co., 12 U.2d 357, 366 P.2d 974 (Utah 1961) held that 
a wage payment statute which excluded banks and 
mercantile houses from the penalty provisions of the 
statute to be an unreasonable classification with no 
reasonable justification and therefore unconsti tutional. 
In the instant case there is no reasonable 
justification to exclude from the operation of § 41-6-182 
a driver or front seat passenger of a motor vehicle 
engaged in pick up, delivery, or service operations 
involving repeated starts and stops and requiring 
the front seat occupant to frequently and repeatedly 
enter and leave the vehicle. 
An ordinary person who is not a professional 
or commercial driver may during their normal day to 
day activities be required to make repeated starts 
and stops requiring them to frequently and repeatedly 
enter and leave their vehicle. They are all similarly 
situated. 
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There is no reasonable justification to exclude 
from the operation of § 41-6-182 a driver or front 
seat passenger when the driver is not detained for 
a suspected violation of- Title 41 other than § 41-6-182 
or another offense. 
A peace officer can observe someone driving down 
a street or highway with part of their seat belt system 
hanging out the door. The provisions of § 41-6-184 
precludes the officer from enforcing § 41-6-182. How-
ever, if a peace officer detains a driver for a speed-
ing violation and observes a seat belt violation then 
the peace officer can enforce § 41-6-182. Both drivers 
are similarly situated by not wearing their seat belt, 
but § 41-6-184 allows only the driver who was speeding 
to be cited for not wearing a seat belt and fined. 
Clearly, this is an unreasonable classification without 
any reasonable justification. 
The United States Supreme Court in Rinaldi v. 
Yaeqer, 384 U.S. 305, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 86 S.Ct. 1497 
(1966) and again in James, Judicial Administrator v. 
Strange, 407 U.S» 128°, 32 L.Ed.2d 600, 92 S.Ct. 2027 
(1972) held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes a 
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requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class 
singled out. 
There is no rationality in the nature of the class 
singled out for enforcement of the statutes challenged in 
this case. The statutory scheme may encourage some overly 
zealous law enforcement officers to issue unwarranted citations 
for other offenses just to cite a person for not wearing a 
seat belt. The statutes under Utah's Motor Vehicle Seat Belt 
Usage Act are arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The defendant's conviction for Not 
Wearing a Seat Belt should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant respectfully submits that based upon the 
foregoing his convictions for No Utah Registration and for Not 
Wearing a Seat Belt should be reversed by this Court and re-
manded to the Lower Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this Court's decision-. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this / day of August, 1990. 
/szJU 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSESf 
Appellant in Pro Se 
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ARTICLE I, REGISTRATION 
10.56,010 Vehicles, Every vehicle, at all times while 
being driven, stopped or parked upon the streets or alleys 
of the city, shall be registered in the name of the owner 
thereof in accordance with the laws of the state, unless 
such vehicle is not required by the laws of the state to be 
registered in this state, and shall display in proper posi-
tion valid and unexpired registration plates or indicia of 
registration meeting the requirements of the laws of the 
state, clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutila-
tion, grease and other obscuring matter, so as to be plainly 
visible and legible at all times; provided, however, if such 
vehicle is not required to be registered in this state, the 
indicia of registration issued by another state, territory, 
possession or district of the United States or a foreign 
country, substantially complying with the provisions of this 
chapter, shall be considered as compliance with this title. 
(Prior code §42-15-36) 
254 
Chapter 10.04 
STATUTES ADOPTED 
Sections: 
10.04.010 Statutes adopted. 
10.04.010 Statutes adopted. All of UCA 41-1, 41-2, 
41-6, 41-7, 41-8, 41-12(a), 41-21 and 41-22, as amended, 
together with all amendments and additions that may hereaf-
ter be made, are enacted, approved and adopted as part of 
this section to form the traffic code for this municipality, 
except as hereinafter specified, and by this reference are 
**de a part of this title to the same extent and effect as 
though such code were copied in this chapter in full. Three 
copies of the laws adopted by reference shall be filed for 
.We and examination in the office of^the city recorder. 
lAdded during 1989 codification) 
ARTICLE 3 
ORIGINAL AND RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION, 
ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE 
41-1-18. Driving without registration or certificate of title 
— Penalty — Temporary permit. 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to drive or move or for an 
owner knowingly to permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any 
vehicle of a type required to be registered in this state: 
(a) which is not registered or for which a certificate of title has not been 
issued or applied for; or 
(b) for which the appropriate fee has not been paid as required unless 
allowed under Subsection (2). 
(2) If an application accompanied by the proper fee has been made in this 
state for registration and certificate of title for a vehicle, it may be operated 
temporarily, pending complete registration, by displaying a valid temporary 
permit or other evidence of the application under rules made by the commis-
sion. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 13; 1937, ch. 65, substituted "is a class B misdemeanor" for 
§ 1; C. 1943, 57-3a-18; L. 1989, ch- 274, § 5. "shall be unlawful" at the beginning of Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- tion (1); and made numerous stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted the . Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
subsection designations (l)(a) and (b) and (2); meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
41-1-19- Vehicles subject to registration — Exceptions-
CD Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer, and semitrailer, 
when driven or moved upon a highway, is subject to the registration and 
certificate of title provisions of this chapter except: 
(a) any vehicle driven or moved upon a highway in conformance with 
the provisions of this chapter relating to manufacturers, transporters, 
41-1-19 MOTOR VEHICLES 
dealers, lien holders, or interstate commercial vehicles duly registered id 
another state and not owned by a resident of the state or under a tempo-} 
rary registration permit issued by the department or dealer as authorizedj 
by this chapter; J 
(b) any vehicle driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose on 
crossing the highway from one property to another; I 
(c) any implement of husbandry, whether of a type otherwise subject to 
registration or not, which is only incidentally operated or moved upon a 
highway; 
(d) any special mobile equipment; 
(e) no certificate of title need be obtained for any vehicle of a type 
subject to registration which is owned by the government of the United 
States; 
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used, or maintained for the trans-
portation of passengers for hire or for the transportation of property, if the 
motor vehicle is duly registered in another state and is owned and oper-
ated by a nonresident of this state; 
(g) any vehicle or combination of vehicles designed, used, or main-
tained for the transportation of persons for hire or for the transportation 
of property, if the vehicle or combination of vehicles is duly registered in 
another state and is owned and operated by a nonresident of this state, 
and if the vehicle or combination of vehicles has a gross laden weight of 
26,000 pounds or less or an unladen weight of 7,000 pounds or less; 
(h) any trailer of 750 pounds or less unladen weight and not designed, 
used, and maintained for the transportation of property or person for hire; 
or 
(i) any manufactured home or mobile home. 
(2) The registration provisions of this chapter do not apply to: 
(a) any off-highway vehicle currently registered under Section 41-22-3, 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-1-1 
(18) "Manufacturer" means every person engaged in the business of 
constructing or assembling vehicles of a type required to be registered at 
an established place of business in this state. 
(19) "Metal tire" means every tire the surface of which in contact with 
the highway is wholly or partially of metal or other hard, nonresilient 
material. 
(20) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and 
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead 
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. 
(21) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a saddle for the 
use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in 
contact with the ground, but excluding a tractor. 
(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of this 
state and who does not engage in intrastate business within this 
state and operate in that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer within this state. » 
(b) Every person who engages in intrastate business within this 
state and operates in that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer in this state or who, even though engaging in interstate 
commerce, maintains any vehicle in this state as the home station of 
that vehicle is considered a resident of this state, in so far as that 
vehicle is concerned in administering this chapter. 
(23) "Off-highway implement of husbandry"' is used as defined under 
Section 41-22-2. 
(24) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2. 
(25) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle. In 
the event a title reflects the names of two or more persons as coowners in 
the alternative by use of the word "or" or "and/r," each coowner is consid-
ered to have granted to the other coowners the absolute right to endorse 
and deliver title and to dispose of the vehicle. If the title reflects the 
names of two or more persons as coowners in the conjunctive by use of the 
word "and," or the title does not reflect any alternative or conjunctive 
word, the title shall require the endorsement of each coowner to transfer 
the vehicle. If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional 
sale or installment sale or mortgage of the vehicle with the right of pur-
chase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and 
with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or 
mortgagor, or if the vehicle is the subject of a security agreement, then 
the conditional vendee, mortgagor, or debtor is considered the owner for 
the purposes of this chapter. If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement to 
lease, the lessor is considered the owner until the lessee exercises his 
option to purchase the vehicle. 
(26) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, associ-
ation, or corporation. 
(27) "Pneumatic tire" means every tire in which compressed air is de-
signed to support the load. 
(28) "Preceding year" means a period of 12 consecutive months fixed by 
the department, which is within 16 months immediately preceding the 
commencement of the registration or license year in which proportional 
registration is sought. The department in fixing the period shall conform 
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OPERATORS' LICENSE ACT 41-2-102 
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles 
moved solely by human power. 
(15) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, hav-
ing a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not 
more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 
(16) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state 
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this 
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and 
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in 
Utah. 
(17) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
(18) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an inter-
est in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person enti-
tled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in 
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as secu-
rity. - ." 
(19) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, or corporation. 
(20) ^TReportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to 
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes 
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128. 
(21) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a 
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(22) "School bus" means every publicly or privately owned motor vehi-
cle designed for transporting ten or more passengers and operated for the 
transportation of children to or from school or school activities. 
(23) "Suspension" means the temporary withdrawal by action of the 
division of a licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(24) 'Taxicab" means any class D motor vehicle transporting any num-
ber of passengers for hire and that is subject to state or federal regulation 
as a taxi. 
(25) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting 
devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
ffistory: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 1; 1935, ch. 47, 
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 57-4-3; L. 1951 
(1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1967, ch. 81, § 1; 1983, 
ch. 183, § 4; C. 1953, § 41-2-1; renumbered 
by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 2; 1987, ch. 136, § 2; 
1989, ch. 22, § 23; 1989, ch. 209, § 1; 1989, 
ch. 252, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment by Chapter 22, effective April 24, 1989, 
substituted "Subsection 41-2-128(4)" for "Sec-
tion 41-2-19(4)" in Subsection (18). 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 252r effec-
tive April 24, 1989, added Subsection (6); re-
designated former Subsections (6) to (22) as (7) 
to (23); and substituted "41-2-128" foi 
"41-2-19(4)" in Subsection (19). 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 209, effec-
tive July 1, 1989, deleted the definitions oi 
"Class A license," "Common carrier," "Con-
tract carrier," and "Private carrier"; added def-
initions of "Class D license," "Class M license,' 
"Commercial driver license (CDL)," "Commer 
cial motor vehicle," "Disqualification," and 
"Taxicab"; renumbered the definitions accord-
ingly; and substituted "Subsection 41-2-122 
(4)" for "Section 41-2-19 (4)" in Subsection (19) 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
77 
ARTICLE 17 
MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT USAGE 
41-6-181. Short title. 
This part [article] is known as the "Motor VehicJe Seat Belt Usage Act/' 
History: C. 1953, 41-6a-l81, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 186, 5 1. 
41-6-182. Driver and front seat passengers. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 41-6-148.20 for children under five years 
of age and except as provided in Subsection (2) for passengers who are at least 
five years of age but younger than 18 years of age, the driver and front seat 
passengers of a motor vehicle, as defined in Subsection 41-6-148.20(1), oper-
ated on a street or highway in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and 
fastened safety belt system, which meets standards promulgated by the De-
partment of Public Safety. 
(2) The driver of a motor vehicle shall secure or cause to be secured a 
properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system on any passenger in the 
front seat who is at least five years of age but younger than 18 years of age. 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-186 
41-6-183. Exceptions. 
This part [article] does not apply to a driver or front seat passenger of: 
(1) a motor vehicle manufactured before July 1, 1966; 
(2) a motor vehicle in which the driver or passengers possess a written 
verification from a licensed physician that the driver or passenger is 
unable to wear a safety seat belt system for physical or medical reasons; 
(3) a motor vehicle which is not required to be equipped with a safety 
seat belt system under federal law; 
(4) a motor vehicle operated by a rural letter carrier of the United 
States Postal Service while performing the duties of a rural letter carrier; 
or 
(5) a motor vehicle engaged in pick up, delivery, or service operations 
involving repeated starts and stops and requiring the front seat occupant 
to frequently and repeatedly enter and leave the vehicle. 
History: C. 1953, 41«6a-183, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 186, § 3. 
41-6-184. Enforcement 
Enforcement of this part [article] by state or local law enforcement agents 
shaft 6e only as a secondary action when a driver of a motor vehicle has been 
detained for a suspected violation of Title 41 other than this part, or another 
offense. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6a-184, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 186, § 4. 
41-6-185. Penalty for violation. 
A person who violates Section 41-6-182 shall be fined $10. Points for a 
motor vehicle reportable violation, as defined under Section 41-2-1 [41-2-102], 
may not be assessed against any person for a violation of Section 41-6-182. 
History. C. 1953, 41-6a-185, enacted by L. "Points for a motor vehicle reportable viola-
1986, ch. 186, § 5; L. 1987, ch. 136, § 6. tion, a* defined under Section 41-2-1, may not" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- for "No motor vehicle moving violation points 
ment in the second sentence substituted may." 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prose-
cution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a differ-
ent offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated: or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be estab-
lished to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not 
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense 
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 4 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination 
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, 
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defen-
dant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in confor-
mity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ii 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, 4 3. 
ANALYSIS 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Severed counts. 
Cited. 
Conduct constituting single cr ime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense 
when evidence shows that the items were re-
tained simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen 
items were the subject of a previous prosecu-
tion for related offenses, a second prosecution 
Severed counts. 
This section does not mandate dismissal if 
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a 
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice'' 
and the district court later refused to rejoin 
them for the same reason after defendant had 
been convicted on one of the counts, the case 
was not one that "should have been tried under 
§ 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 
1987). 
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 
77-1-5, Prosecuting party. 
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in 
the name of the state of Utah. A criminal action for violation of any county or 
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the governmental 
entity involved. 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the 
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, 
order an information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defen-
dant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any 
bill of particulars furnished m support thereof, do not constitute the of-
fense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the 
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and 
entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable 
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly 
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impanel-
ing or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the 
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect 
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged 
and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to 
any other prosecution for the offense charge^. 
Rule 25 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may 
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party 
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or 
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered m 
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted 
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the 
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to 
establish offense charged. Rule 17 
Right to speedv trial. Utah Const, Art I 
Sec 12. * 774-6 
DECISIONS 
of those cases requested and received psychiat-
ric examination and who was appointed vari-
ous counsel because of necessity and at his own 
request, was not denied right to speedv trial 
where he was held sane on August 14 1969 
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970 
and commenced on April 3. 1970. after disposi-
tion of defendant's motion to dismiss made on 
Januarv 7 State v Carlsen 25 Utah 2d 136 
478 P2d 326 (1970) 
Cross-References. — Detainers against 
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to 
bring to trial, * 77-29-1 
Dismissal for failure to find indictment, 
> 77-12-2. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Dismissal of codefendant. 
Dismissal order 
Good cause for delay. 
Magistrate's authority to dismiss. 
Offense improperly alleged 
Reasonableness of delay 
Statutes not in conflict. 
Subsequent prosecution 
ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION or LTAIT 
Gun control laws, validity and construe Bear Arms, Lucilius V. 1 m»M\, 2^ H-r. . 
tion of, 23 A. L R. T,d 8i3. L. Kcv. 473. 
licsluctious on t ic Uiglit To T" -i Aim, 
Law Reviews. —Slate ,uid Federal Fire.uins Lo£> l.iinMi, 
The Coiibtitutior.nl Kight to Keep and 08 U. Pa. L. How 005. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propeity, without due 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. body, or agency autiioiizcd b\ l.iu to de-
Montana Coi.st., Art. I l l , §27. tcn.iiiie the questions; (b) _ an i.-quiry 
i n t o tllP mor>t<. aJ t l~ - - " • 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. —acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Cross-Reference. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Prohibition on private or special laws, L^ 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Const., Art. VI, § 26. Only where some persons or transac-
tions excluded from operation of law are. 
In general. ^ to the subject matter of the law, in 
All laws shall operate uniformly wher- no differentiate class from those in-
e\er uniform laws can be enacted. State eluded in its operation, is the 1 nv 
r. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 26 discriminatory in the sense of being arbi-
A. L. R. 696. trary and unconstitutional, and if reason-
Objects and purposes of law present able basis to differentiate can be found, 
touchstone for determining proper and law must be held constitutional. State v. 
improper classifications. State v. Mason, J. B. k R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 
94 U. 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330; P. 2d 766. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Inability of legislature to make perfect 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. classification does not render statute un-
One who assails legislative classifica- constitutional. State v. J. B. & R. E. 
tion as arbitrary has burden of proving Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
it to be such. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walk- Tn determining whether classification 
er, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
 m a < j 0 by legislature is unconstitutional, 
Classification is never unreasonable or discrimination is very essence of classi-
irbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion fication and is not objectionable unless 
features so long as there is some basis for founded upon unreasonable distinctions, 
differentiation between classes or subject Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 
matters included, as compared to those 194 P. 2d 464. 
^eluded, provided differentiation bears An act is never unconstitutional be-
••asonable relation to purposes of act. cause of discriminatiou as long as there is 
>»ate v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100
 s o m e reasonable basis for differentiation 
1. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. between classes which is related to the 
Before legislative enactment can be in- purposes to be accomplished by the act, 
>rfered with, court must be able to say and it applies uniformly to all persons 
•Hat there is no fair reason for the law within the class. Hansen v. Public Em-
,vat would not require equallv its exten- plovees' Retirement System Board of Ad-
AMENDMENT III [1791] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of 
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV [1791] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable'searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shatt 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and part.cularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V [1791] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of lifer liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV [1868] 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several. States according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Execu-
tive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age 
in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, 
or under any State, who having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive 
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disa-
bility. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, in-
cluding debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing in-
surrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV [1870] 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude. 
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• STATE OF UTAH 
• COUNTY OF CACHE 
JX.C1TY OF L^cQf i i o 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE 
1ST CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE . * 
LOCATED AT V " \ O K > . \ P Q I Q 
ON OR BEFORE THE^DAY Qf<*K3<^ , i§& 
AT THE HOUR OF ^^OC? ( A ^ y P.M. 
IN THE COURT. 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
Date of Conviction/Forfeiture 
Fine Suspended 
-Jail Suspended 
Surcharge $ 
PLEA/FINDING 
G Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
• Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
D Minimum 
Q Intermediate 
C Maximum 
Address 
'icture 10 
[JSfrYes C No 
DLO 
USE 
m
-WaU&Ui ^ fitf. 
LOGAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
r 
(CASE 
"XMonftr 
CITATION NO. 
Nam* (Last) (Firs!) 
Place of Birth 
J&X&-. 
3* £ 
Driver License No. 
P i c t u r e l O V e h i d 
D08 ° 
Vehicle Color 
t& *==*-
J A 
(State) 
m&y>TL\ 
(Zip) Phone 
(Middle) 
^ 
i social security Numoer iMt. j wt. j Hair j Eyes 
52.v7yyg^ ftY M tew a. State 
Vehicle Year 
k 
Vehicle Make 
Vehicle License No. 
&L 
State 
Race 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
UTAH COUNTY CITY 
Moa«i v , 
D D 
D D 
D • 
a V5\ V _^kk 
A . ^ ' 5 L 
Location i Mite Post No. (Interstate I 
- ^ - , * - » - Military Time 
I t
Yes G No 
Speeding 
l^i 
% . 
Accident 
R N 
Misd. 
Cit. 
45L 
'6VO 
VST. 
Traf. 
X 
X 
> * 
Direction
 /^ —->J 
N S-£WJ) 
MPH Over 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULXSERVED UPON THE 
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOwpR BELIEVE AND SO 
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENOANT DID COMMIT THE(0FFENSE HEREIN SET 
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. 
OFFICER. VW\ g ^ A - C P . ^ , 
COMPLAINANT _ 
DATE 
L fOtt^v^ 
ID ^2>jT7. 
ID# 
—MISD. CIT.-BCI— 
TRAFFIC - COURT 
T-T- .33 
Date Sent to DLD Docket No. 
RIGHT INDEX 
* > 
"•"N TKZ CIPCUIT COURT STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DERAILMENT 
LOGAN CITY, ) 
P l a i n t i f f I N F O R M A T I O N 
vs. ) 
CARLSEN, David C. 
598 North Main 
Logan, Utah 
3/5/49 Defendant ) 
vqi*1 tffl 
The undersigned, CRAIG ANDREWS under oath, states on the 
information and belief that the above named Defendant committed the 
crime (s) of: 
COUNT 1: NO UTAH REGISTRATION (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
COUNT 2: FAILURE TO SIGNAL TO TURN (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
COUNT 3: DRIVER NOT SEATBELTED (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
at Logan, Utah on 8/8/89 in violation of the following sections of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City: 
10.56.010; 10.04.010 incorporating by reference Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) Sections 41^ -6-69 (1), 41-6-182 
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts 
constituting the offense were: 
COUNT 1: That the Defendant did drive or permit a motor vehicle to be 
driven, stopped or parked on the streets or alleys of the City of Logan 
without vehicle displaying in proper position valid and unexpired 
registration plates or indication of registration meeting the 
requirements of the laws of the State of Utah. Class B Misdemeanor 
COUNT 2: That the Defendant did make a right/left -hand turn without 
giving a signal of intention to do so continuously for at least three 
(3) seconds proceeding the beginning of the turn. Class B Misdemeanor 
COUNT 3: That the Defendant, being the driver or operator of a vehicle 
upon the streets of Logan City did fail to secure to cause to be secured 
to himself/herself a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt 
system. Class B Misdemeanor 
This information is based on evidence obtained frcm the following 
witnesses: 
G. MONROE, LCPD 
Authorized for presentment & filing ___ 
' COMPLAINANT 
( J/^  lco*/f $ <^X^^L^z£jP Subscribed & sworn to before ire 
Logan City" Prosecutor /Attorney^ this ^y &aY °f O c^/~~ 19S~>-
DAMAGES: YES NO 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LXAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITYr ) 
A M E N D E D 
P l a i n t i f f I N F O R M A T I O N 
vs. ) 
CARLSEN, David C. 
598 North Main 
Loganf Utah 
3/5/49 
Defendant ) 
The undersigned, CRAIG ANDREWS under oath, states on the information and 
belief that the above named Defendant ccramitted the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: NO UTAH REGISTRATION. (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
OOUNT 2: FAILURE TO SIGNAL TO .TORN (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
COUNT 3: DRIVER NOT SEATBECTBD (DETRACTION) 
at Logan, Utah on 8/8/89 in violation of the following sections of the 
Revised Ordinances of logan City: 
10.04.010 incorporating by reference Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
Sections 41-1-18, 41-6-69(1), 41-6-182 
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's.acts constituting 
the offense were: 
COUNT 1: Hiat the Defendant did drive or pennit a motor vehicle to be driven 
on the streets of the City of Logan without vehicle displaying in proper 
position valid and unexpired registration plates or indication of 
registration meeting the requirements of the laws of the State of Utah. 
Class B Misdemeanor 
OOUNT 2: That the Defendant did turn a vehicle from a direct course when 
such movement could not be made with reasonable safety and/or Defendant 
turned said vehicle without giving an appropriate signal for at least three 
(3) seconds preceeding the beginning of the turn or change. 
Class B Misdemeanor 
COUNT 3: That the Defendant, being the driver or operator of a vehicle upon 
the streets of Logan City did fail to secure or cause to be secured to 
himself/herself a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system. 
Infraction 
Ihis information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
G. MONROE, LCPD 
Authorized for presentinent & filing 
ftA.^/a&uAAdj 
(L^ iuU^-
Logan Cxttf Prosecutor/Attorney-
DMffiGES: YES NO 
•COMELAINANr 
Subscribed & swam t o before me 
this zg/tipyffi f^ CcL l ^ f 
First Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache, 
Logan Department 
STATE OF UTAH ~Z&GK?rT?r!*f-~ JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff ) 
^)nyijH Onc\sr€r\ 
Defendant ) 
; (having been adjudged) (sntoped a pW ofKiUILTY to th 
a Class. 
a Class, 
a Class. 
a Class. 
£ Defendant j    ego   lipg )G   e charge of Count No. 
Count No. 2 ^ _ _ _ 
count NO. 3 f)f\ver [)<Q-f- feqj-belt^cf-
Count No.4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
.Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being 
present (with) (having wcrivod) Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows: 
Count No. 1 Defendant is fined $ t*^ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ blO 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 2 Defendant is fined $. . plus surcharge of 
$. 
and to be imprisoned for 
less the following suspended 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 3 Defendant is fined $ / U plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $. 
$. 10_ 
and to be imprisoned for 
and to be imprisoned for
 m 
Stay of Execution to FRIDAY. 
TOTAL TO BE PAID 
days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 4 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
. days in the Cache County Jail with. days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
at 4:30 p.m. and the defendant is 
. per beginning ordered to appear in Court at said time. Fine to be paid in installments of $ 
Defendant may appeal this judgment within 30 days to Court of Appeal/in Sa 
TWH 1-3Q-7 o 
Suspend*/ ^ors proof &C Rtf* 
r Oil l \ 
JZ— —- } 
i . , . . /- - ^ ;•-. 
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DAVID CRAIG CABLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
78 \ North 100 East, # 1 
Logan, Utah 
DEC 211989 
CIRCUIT COURT L U 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY* OP CACHE, LOGAN C H Y DEPAKMEMT 
LOGAN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant* 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR AN ARREST OP 
JUDCH4EMT 
Case No, 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen, and hereby 
respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order of an Arrest of Judgment 
in the above-entitled matter* 
The basis for this motion is that the provisions of Section 10.04.010 of 
the revised Ordinances of Logan City incorporating by reference Section 41-6-182 
U.CJU (1953 as amended) subjects a person situated as the defendant in this 
case to an unreasonable classification without any reasonable justification 
in violation of the provisions of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
of Utah which requires that All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation, and the statute subjects a person situated as the defendant in this 
case to arbitrary and invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Urited States Constitution, 
A further basis for this motion is that the defendant has been denied 
Due Process of Law as secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution because when viewing the evidence adduced at the trial 
as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable or 
prudent person could have found the defendant guilty of the offense of No 
Utah Registration beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A further basis for this motion is that the evidence adduced at the 
trial clearly establishes that Officer Monroe did not have probable cause to 
believe that the defendant did not properly make a left hand turn signal and 
did not have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed any 
criminal offense when he stopped the defendant on August 8, 1989 and the 
evidence otained by Officer Monroe te preaecute the defendant for the offenses 
of No Utah Registration and No Seai Belt was tainted and the convictions violate 
the doctrine of the Fruits of the Poisnous Tree. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 1989. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN^ 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for an Arrest of 
Judgment to Cherl Russell, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main, 
Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S. Mailbox 
on this 21st day of December, 1989. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LDGAN CITY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN ] 
Defendant ] 
) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST 
) JUDGMENT 
> case No. flQ2nfiflfiS7 
OCMES NCW the Logan City Prosecutor, Cheryl A. Russell, and responds to 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment as follows: 
1. " Defendant's motion is unsupported by an affidavit or memorandum to 
support his motion to arrest judgment arid is therefore insufficient on its 
face. 
2. Defendant's motion fails to set forth hew specifically Logan City 
Ordinance 10.04.010 incorporating by reference Section 41-6-182 of Utah Code 
makes an unreasonable classification in violation of Article I, Section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The burden of establishing the same is on the Defendant and he 
has failed in his motion herein to establish the same. 
3. Defendant's motion fails likewise to set forth any evidence of a 
violation of Due Process of Law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The jury found that the Defendant was guilty of 
the offense of No Utah Registration beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. Although the Defendant was found not guilty of making a left hand 
turn by the jury, it does not necessarily follow there was no reason for the 
stop. The test for the stop is a reasonable suspicion not probable cause. 
See Terry v. Ohio. 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S. Ct 1868 (1968). The later 
is for an arrest. Officer Monroe clearly saw the defendant fail to make a 
mechanical left turn signal. Furthermore, Defendant was not only cited for 
the turn tut also for no Utah Registration as well. Finally, Defendant 
filed to make a motion to suppress the evidence of no Utah registration and 
no seat belt at the time of the trial. Defendant thereby waived his right to 
object to the same. 
X^ HEREFORE, Plaintiff Logan City prays Defendant's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment be denied. 
DATED this 3/ day of December, 1989. 
CHERWA. RUSSELL 
LOGAN C m PROSECUTOR 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Sylvia Tlbbitts, secretary for the Logan City Attorneys Office, 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Defendant's^ 
Motion to Arrest Judgment to: 
David Craig Carlsen 
Defendant in Pro Se 
78.5 North 100 East #1 
Logan, Utah 84321 
and 
Arden W. Lauritzen 
Attorney of record for David Craig Carlsen 
326 North First East 
P. 0. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Dated:/£-3/. £? 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOGAN CITY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DAVID CARLSEN, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 892008887CV 
TRIAL IN THE above referred to matter was held before a 
Jury on the 20th day of December, 1989. The Jury having 
returned a verdict of guilty* and the Court having set the date 
of January 30, 1990 for sentencing. The Defendant has filed a 
Motion for an Arrest of Judgment. The Court after reviewing 
said Motion and Plaintiff's response thereto finds that there 
is no basis upon which to Arrest Judgment and therefore 
Defendant's Motion is hereby denied. 
Dated this 11th day of January, 1990. 
BY THE/C6I 
Clint S. 
Circuit Court 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
78 h North 100 East, # 1 
Logan, Utah 84 32] 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
-LOGAN CITY, ; 
Plaintiff, : DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION 
-vs- : FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, * : 
Defendant. ; Case No- 892008887 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen 
and hereby respectfully moves this Court for an Order to Arrest 
Judgment in the above-entitled matter. 
The basis for this motion is that the No Utah Registration 
Statutes, U.C.A. § 41-1-18, § 41-1-19 (f), and § 41-1-1 (22), 
(1953 as amended) does not give a clear definition for the term 
of nonresident and fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of the residency requirements imposed by said statutes 
and therefore are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and the application of saicl statutes against 
the defendant in this case deprived the defendant of Equal 
Protection of the Laws and restricted his right to Freedom 
of Travel as secured under the Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 1990. 
'/farftf/ ^^ 
DAVTS CRAIG C A R L S E N ' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED a true a-nd correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental 
Motion for an Arrest of Judgment and the Memorandum in Support 
thereof to Cherl Russell, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 
North Main, Logan, Utah, 8432], postage prepaid and by placing 
the same in a U.S. Mailbox on this 15th day of January, 1990. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSfift ' J 
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DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
78 \ North 100 East, # ] 
Logan, Utah 84321 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, : 
Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
-vs- : MOTION FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. : Case No. 892008887 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen, 
and hereby respectfully submits the following Memorandum in 
Support of his Supplemental Motion for an Arrest of Judgment: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen was tried 
before this Court on a jury trial for the offense of No Utah 
Registration on the 20th day of December, 1989. The testimony 
adduced at the trial shows that on the 8th day of August, 1989, 
the defendant was operating a vehicle properly registered to him 
in the State of Idaho. The defendant testified that he considered 
himself to be a resident of the State of Idaho and residing 
in Preston, Idaho. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NO UTAH REGISTRATION STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
It is well recognized in law that one may not be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably 
understand to be proscribed/"United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, (1954); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972); and Logan City v. Carlsen,'585 P.2d 449, cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 1131 (1979). 
The defendant in this case was charged by Information 
for violating the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-18, (1953 as amended) 
which provides as follows: 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to drive 
or move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be driven 
or moved upon any highway any vehicle of a type required 
to be registered in this state: 
The exceptions to the vehicles required to be registered 
in the State of Utah is defined under the provisions of U.C.A. 
§ 41-1-19, (1953 as amended) in which the pertinent parts states 
as follows: 
-2-
(1) Every motor vehicle, combination of vehicles, trailer, 
and simitrailer, when driven or moved upon a highway, is 
subject to the registration and certificate of title 
provisions of this chapter except: 
(f) any motor vehicle not designed, used, or maintained 
for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the 
transportation of property, if t, the vehicle is duly 
registered in another state and is owned and operated 
by a nonresident of this state; 
At the trial in the instant case, the prosecutor during 
discussions with the Court and defense counsel on instructing the 
jury as to the term of nonresident claimed that the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 41-2-102 (16), (1953 as amended) is the applicable 
statute defining the terra of nonresident. However, this statute 
applies only to a Utah Operator's License and since the defendant 
was not cited or charged by Information for not having a valid 
Utah Driverfs License, the provisions of this statute was not 
properly applied to the Motor Vehicle Act in the instant case. 
The term of nonresident for the purposes of required 
registration under the.Motor vehicle Act is defined under the 
provisions of U.C.A. § 41-1-1# (1953 as amended) of which the 
pertinent part states as follows: 
-3-
(22) (a) "Nonresident" means every person who is not 
a resident of this state and who does not engage in 
intrastate business within this state and operate in 
that business any motor vehicle, trailer, or simitrailer 
within this state. 
It is the defendant's contention that the Motor Vehicle 
Act does not give a clear definition of the term, "Nonresident" 
for required motor vehicle registration. The legislature has 
enacted statutes giving a cltear definition of residency require-
ments for the purposes of voter registration, U.C.A. § 20-2-13, 
§ 20-2-14, (1953 as amended); for the purpose, student tuition 
fees, U.C.A. § 53B-8-102, (1953 as amended); for the purpose 
of receiving public assistance, U.C.A. § 62A-9-115, (1953 as amended); 
and for the purpose of receiving a notarial commission, U.C.A. 
§ 46-1-3, (1953 as amended). However, the legislature under 
the Motor Vehicle Act which imposes a criminal penalty has 
failed to enact a statute which gives a clear definition of 
the residency requirements for the purpose of motor vehicle 
registrations. 
It is clearly unfair that during discussions on instructing 
the jury the Court, prosecutor and defense counsel could not 
determine the proper residency requirements under the Motor 
-4-
Vehicle Act and at the same time hold the defendant criminally 
responsible for acts in which a person of ordinary intelligence 
should have known to be proscribed by the statutes. The statutes 
under the Motor Vehicle Act are unconstitutionally vague in that 
said statutes fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence, 
fair notice of the residency requirements for the purpose of 
motor vehicle registrations under such Act. 
Furthermore, the application of U.C.A. § 41-2-302 (16), 
(1953 as amended) against the defendant in this case subjected 
him to arbitrary and invidious discrimination in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause and an infringement of his right to 
freedom of travel in violation of the United States Constitution, 
Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F.Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970). 
DATED this 15th day of January, 1990. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, ] 
Plaintiff ; 
vs. ; 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, ] 
Defendant ] 
> PLAINTIFF'S MEMDPANDIM IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) SUPPLEMENTAL M3TION FOR 
AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
) No. 892008887 
OCMES NOW Plaintiff by and through their attorney, Cheryl A. Russell, 
Logan City Prosecutor, and responds to Defendant's Supplemental Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment as follows: 
1. The court issued on January 11, 1990 a Memorandum Decision denying 
Defendant's notion to arrest judgment. 
2. The statement of facts in Defendant's memorandum in support of 
supplemental motion for an arrest of judgment conveniently leaves out the 
undisputed fact the Defendant had a Utah driver's license; was working in the 
State of Utah; and was living five days a week in Utah and going to Idaho on 
weekends for 2 days. Plaintiff believes that the jury elected to believe 
these facts over Defendant's testimony that he considered himself an Idaho 
resident and. to be living in Preston, Idaho. 
3. At the time of trial, Defendant's attorney requested that an 
instruction be given defining residency. The court as well as the 
prosecution had no objection to such an instruction being given. Defendant's 
counsel was then asked to offer a proposed instruction on the sane. 
Defendant's counsel did not have a proposed instruction. So it was agreed to 
use the definition of resident as set forth in Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) Section 41-2-102(16). 
4. Furthermore, Defendant did not request that the definition alleged 
to be set forth in Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 41-1-19 be 
given by the court at trial. This is raised for the first time in his 
supplemental motion. 
5. The definition in Utah Cede Annotated (1952 as amended) Section 
41-2-102(16) was appropriate urder the facts of this case since Defendant at 
the time of the alleged offense had a Utah drivers license. 
6. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 41-1-19(f) 
specifically provides the exception is only applicable "if the vehicle is 
duly registered in another state and is owned and operated by a nonresident 
of this state" (Utah). Defendant was clearly a resident of Utah - he had a 
Utah drivers license. 
7. Defendant for the first time in his supplemental motion raises the 
issues of Due Process and Equal Protection. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) Section 41-1-1(22) sets forth the definition of residency. 
Interestingly enough, neither the Defendant in his supplemental motion nor 
his attorney requested that the terms thereof be used in the court's 
instruction, 
8. Finally, Defendant's motion and memorandum fails to set forth how 
Defendant was denied equal protection by alleged arbitrary and invidious 
discrimination. Defendant has the burden on said issue. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests Defendant's supplemental motion to arrest 
also be denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
CHERYLS. RUSSELL 
Logan City Prosecutor 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOGAN CITY, ) 
P l a i n t i f f ] 
v s . ] 
DAVID CARLSEN, ] 
""Defendant ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 892008887CV 
! 
TRIAL ON THE above referred to matter was held before a 
jury on the 20th day of 'December, 1989. The Jury having 
returned a verdict of guilty and the Court having set the date 
of January 30, 1990 for sentencing. The Defendant had 
previously filed a Motion for an Arrest of Judgment which was 
denied by Memorandum Decision dated January 11, 1990. The 
Defendant has now filed a Supplemental Motion for an -Arrest of 
Judgment and a Memorandum in support thereof. The basis for 
Defendant's Motion is that the applicable Utah Statutes, (See 
Section 41-1-18, 41-1-19 (f), and 41-1-1 (22) U.C.A.) does not 
give a clear definition to the term of non-resident and fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the 
residency requirements imposed by said Statutes and therefore 
are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment and that the Defendant was 
deprived of equal protection of the laws and restricted his 
right to freedom of travel as secured under the Constitution 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The Court after reviewing said Supplemental Motion and 
Logan City vs. David Carlson 
#892008887 
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Plaintiffs response thereto finds that there is no basis upon 
which to Arrest Judgment and therefore Defendant's Motion is 
hereby denied. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 19! 
'URT: 
C] 
Circuit 
Judkins 
ourt Judge 
